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Abstract
Textual adversarial attacking has received
wide and increasing attention in recent years.
Various attack models have been proposed,
which are enormously distinct and imple-
mented with different programming frame-
works and settings. These facts hinder quick
utilization and apt comparison of attack mod-
els. In this paper, we present an open-
source textual adversarial attack toolkit named
OpenAttack. It currently builds in 12 typ-
ical attack models that cover all the attack
types. Its highly inclusive modular design not
only supports quick utilization of existing at-
tack models, but also enables great flexibility
and extensibility. OpenAttack has broad
uses including comparing and evaluating at-
tack models, measuring robustness of a vic-
tim model, assisting in developing new attack
models, and adversarial training. Source code,
built-in models and documentation can be
obtained at https://github.com/thunlp/
OpenAttack.
1 Introduction
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have been found
to be susceptible to adversarial attacks (Szegedy
et al., 2014; Goodfellow et al., 2015). The attacker
uses adversarial examples, which are maliciously
crafted by imposing small perturbations on original
input, to fool the victim model. With the wide appli-
cation of DNNs to practical systems accompanied
by growing concern about their security, research
on adversarial attacking has become increasingly
important. Moreover, adversarial attacks are also
helpful to improve robustness and interpretability
of DNNs (Wallace et al., 2019a).
In the field of natural language processing (NLP),
diverse adversarial attack models have been pro-
posed (Zhang et al., 2020). These models vary
∗Indicates equal contribution
in accessibility to the victim model, ranging from
having full knowledge to total ignorance, and per-
turbation level, ranging from char to sentence. In
addition, they are originally proposed to attack dif-
ferent victim models on different tasks under dif-
ferent evaluation protocols.
This immense diversity in textual adversarial at-
tacking causes serious difficulty for fair and apt
comparison between different models, which is
unfavourable to the development of this research
field. Further, although most of existing textual
attack models are open-source, they use different
programming frameworks and implementation set-
tings, which lead to unnecessary time and effort
when utilizing them.
To tackle these challenges, we present an open-
source toolkit for textual adversarial attacking
named OpenAttack. This Python-based toolkit
can handle the whole process of textual adversarial
attacking including preprocessing text, accessing
the victim model, generating adversarial examples
and evaluation. It supports attacking any victim
models for text classification tasks such as senti-
ment analysis and natural language inference (sen-
tence pair classification). OpenAttack has sys-
tematic modular design, which disassembles many
different attack models, extract the common com-
ponents and wisely recombine them together. More
importantly, it has following significant features:
• Full coverage of attack model types.
OpenAttack currently includes 12 typical
attack models which cover all the types
of accessibility to the victim model and
perturbation levels.
• Supporting comprehensive evaluation of tex-
tual adversarial attack models. OpenAttack
incorporates 8 different evaluation metrics
aiming to thoroughly evaluate an attack model
from different perspectives including attack
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Model Accessibility Perturbation Main Idea
SEA (Ribeiro et al., 2018) Decision Sentence Rule-based paraphrasing
SCPN (Iyyer et al., 2018) Blind Sentence Paraphrasing
GAN (Zhao et al., 2018) Decision Sentence Text generation by encoder-decoder
TextFooler (Jin et al., 2020) Score Word Greedy word substitution
PWWS (Ren et al., 2019) Score Word Greedy word substitution
Genetic (Alzantot et al., 2018) Score Word Genetic algorithm-based word substitution
FD (Papernot et al., 2016b) Gradient Word Gradient-based word substitution
TextBugger (Li et al., 2019) Gradient, Score Word+Char Greedy word substitution and character manipulation
UAT (Wallace et al., 2019a) Gradient Word, Char Gradient-based word or character manipulation
HotFlip (Ebrahimi et al., 2018) Gradient Word, Char Gradient-based word or character substitution
VIPER (Eger et al., 2019) Blind Char Visually similar character substitution
DeepWordBug (Gao et al., 2018) Score Char Greedy character manipulation
Table 1: Textual adversarial attack models involved in OpenAttack. “Accessibility” is short for accessibility
to the victim model, and “Perturbation” is short for perturbation level. “Sentence”, “Word” and “Char” refer
to sentence-, word- and character-level perturbations. In the columns of Accessibility and Perturbation, “A, B”
means that the attack model supports both A and B , while “A+B” means that the attack model conducts A and B
simultaneously.
effectiveness, adversarial example quality and
attack efficiency.
• Great flexibility and extensibility. For one
thing, OpenAttack can be easily used to
attack any customized victim model, even
a non-neural model, no matter which pro-
gramming framework the model is imple-
mented with (PyTorch, TensorFlow, Keras,
etc.). For another, under the architecture of
OpenAttack, new attack models can be ef-
fortlessly developed and evaluated.
Thanks to these features, OpenAttack can be
used to (1) provide various handy baselines for
attack models; (2) comprehensively evaluate attack
models using its thorough evaluation metrics; (3)
assist in quick development of new attack models
with the help of its common attack components;
(4) evaluate the robustness of a machine learning
model against various adversarial attacks; and (5)
conduct adversarial training (Goodfellow et al.,
2015) to improve robustness of a machine learning
model by enriching the training data with generated
adversarial examples.
2 Formalization and Categorization of
Textual Adversarial Attacking
We first formalize the task of textual adversarial
attacking for text classification models. For a given
text sequence x that is correctly classified as its
ground-truth label y by the victim model F , the
attack model A is supposed to transform x into xˆ
by small perturbations, whose ground-truth label is
still y but classification result given by F is yˆ 6= y.1
According to the attack model’s accessibility
to the victim model, existing attack models can
be categorized into four classes, namely gradient-
based, score-based, decision-based and blind mod-
els. First, gradient-based attack models are also
called white-box attack models, which require full
knowledge of the victim model to conduct gradi-
ent update. Most of them are inspired by the fast
gradient sign method (Goodfellow et al., 2015) and
forward derivative method (Papernot et al., 2016a)
in adversarial attacking on images.
In contrast to white-box attack models, black-
box models do not need to have complete informa-
tion on the victim model, and can be subcategorized
into score-based, decision-based and blind models.
Blind models are ignorant of the victim model at all.
Score-based models require the prediction scores
(classification probabilities) of the victim model,
while decision-based models only need the final
decision (predicted class).
According to the level of perturbations imposed
on the original text sequence, textual adversarial
attack models can be classified into sentence-level,
word-level and character-level models. Sentence-
level attack models craft adversarial examples
mainly by adding distracting sentences (Jia and
Liang, 2017), paraphrasing (Iyyer et al., 2018;
Ribeiro et al., 2018) and text generation by encoder-
decoder (Zhao et al., 2018). Word-level attack mod-
els mostly conduct word substitution, namely sub-
1This formalization also fits the classification tasks for a
pair of text sequences where x is a sequence pair.
stituting some words in the original sequence with
semantically identical or similar words such as syn-
onyms (Jin et al., 2020; Ren et al., 2019; Alzantot
et al., 2018). Some word-level attack models also
use operations including deleting and adding words
(Zhang et al., 2019). Character-level attack models
usually carry out character manipulations including
swap, substitution, deletion, insertion and repeating
(Eger et al., 2019; Ebrahimi et al., 2018; Belinkov
and Bisk, 2018; Gao et al., 2018).
Finally, adversarial attack models can also be
categorized into targeted and untargeted models
based on whether the wrong classification result
given by the victim model, i.e., yˆ, is prespecified.
Most of existing attack models support (by minor
adjustment) both targeted and untargeted attacks,
and we give no particular attention to this attribute
of attack models in this paper.
Currently OpenAttack includes 12 different
attack models, which cover all the victim model
accessibility and perturbation level types. Table 1
lists the attack models involved in OpenAttack.
3 Toolkit Design and Architecture
In this section, we describe the design philosophy
and modular architecture of OpenAttack.
As mentioned before, we try to extract and prop-
erly reorganize the common components from dif-
ferent attack models, so that any attack model can
be assembled by them. Considering the significant
distinctions among different attack models, espe-
cially between the sentence-level and word/char-
level models, it is hard to embrace all the attack
models within a unified framework. Therefore, we
leave considerable freedom for the skeleton design
of attack models, and focus more on streamlining
the general processing of adversarial attacking and
the common actions used in attack models. Next
we introduce the modules of OpenAttack one
by one, and Figure 1 illustrates an overview of all
the modules.
• TextProcessor. This module is aimed at pro-
cessing the original text sequence so as to
assist attack models in generating adversar-
ial examples. It consists of several functions
which are used for tokenization, lemmati-
zation, delemmatization, word sense disam-
biguation (WSD), named entity recognition
(NER) and dependency parsing, respectively.
Among them, tokenization, lemmatization and
WSD functions are from Natural Language
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Figure 1: Overall architecture of OpenAttack.
Toolkit (NLTK) (Bird et al., 2009), NER and
dependency parsing functions are from Stanza
(Qi et al., 2020), and delemmatization func-
tion is implemented by us.
• Classifier. This module wraps the victim
classification model. It supports both neu-
ral network-based model implemented by any
programming fr mework and traditional ma-
chine learning model. It is mainly composed
of three functions that are used to obtain the
gradient with respect to the input, prediction
scores and predicted class of a victim model.
• Attacker. This is the core module of
OpenAttack. It comprises various attack
models and can generate adversarial examples
for given input against a victim model.
• Substitute. This is an assistant module of At-
tacker. It packs different word and character
substitution methods which are widely used
in word- and character-level attack models.
Attacker queries this module to get substitu-
tions for a word or character. Now it includes
word embedding-based (Alzantot et al., 2018;
Jin et al., 2020), synonym-based (Ren et al.,
2019) and sememe-based (Zang et al., 2020)
word substitution methods, and visual charac-
ter substitution method (Eger et al., 2019).
• Metric. This module provides several ad-
versarial example quality metrics which can
serve as either the constraints on the adver-
sarial examples during attacking or evalu-
ation metrics for evaluating adversarial at-
tacks. It currently includes following met-
rics: (1) language model prediction score for
a given word in a context given by Google
one-billion words language model (Jozefow-
icz et al., 2016) (this metric can be used as the
constraint on adversarial examples only); (2)
Perspective Metric Better?
Attack
Effectiveness
Attack Success Rate Higher
Adversarial
Example
Quality
Word Modification Rate Lower
Levenshtein Edit Distance Lower
Semantic Similarity Higher
Fluency (GPT-2 perplexity) Lower
Grammaticality (Grammatical Errors) Lower
Attack
Efficiency
Average Victim Model Query Times Lower
Average Running Time Lower
Table 2: Evaluation metrics incorporated in
OpenAttack. “Higher” and “Lower” mean the
higher/lower the metric is, the better an attack model
performs.
word modification rate, the percentage of mod-
ified words of an adversarial example com-
pared with original sequence; (3) Levenshtein
edit distance between the adversarial example
and original sequence; (4) semantic similarity
between the adversarial example and origi-
nal input which is measured with Universal
Sentence Encoder (Cer et al., 2018); (5) ad-
versarial example fluency that is measure with
perplexity computed by GPT-2 (Radford et al.,
2019); and (6) grammaticality that is measure
by the grammatical errors given by Language-
Tool.2
• AttackEval. This module is mainly used to
evaluate textual adversarial attacks from dif-
ferent perspectives including attack effective-
ness, adversarial example quality and attack
efficiency.
Firstly, the evaluation metric for attack effec-
tiveness is attack success rate, the percentage
of the attacks that successfully fool the victim
model.
t Secondly, for adversarial example quality
evaluation, it needs to invoke the Metric mod-
ule for its (2)-(6) evaluation metrics.
Finally, attack efficiency includes two metrics
involving average query times to victim model
and average running time when attacking one
input sequence.
Among these metrics, word modification rate
is specially for word-level attacks and the
others are applicable to all attacks. Table 2
lists all the evaluation metrics suppoted by
OpenAttack.
2https://www.languagetool.org
In addition, this module can also visualize and
save attack results, e.g., display original input
sequences and adversarial examples.
• DataManager. This module manages all the
data as well as saved models that are used
in other modules. It supports accessing and
downloading data/models. Specifically, it
deals with the data used in the Substitute mod-
ule such as character embeddings, word em-
beddings and WordNet synonyms, the mod-
els used in the TextProcessor module such as
NER model and dependency parser, the built-
in trained victim models, and auxiliary models
used in Attacker such as translation model for
the paraphrasing-based attack models. This
module helps efficiently and handily utilize
data.
4 Toolkit Usage
OpenAttack provides a set of easy-to-use inter-
faces that can meet almost all the needs in textual
adversarial attacking, such as preprocessing text,
generating adversarial examples to attack a victim
model and evaluating attack models. Moreover,
OpenAttack has great flexibility and extensibil-
ity and supports easy customization of victim mod-
els and attack models. Next, we showcase some
basic usages of OpenAttack.
4.1 Built-in Attack and Evaluation
OpenAttack builds in some commonly used text
classification models such as LSTM (Hochreiter
and Schmidhuber, 1997) and BERT (Devlin et al.,
2019) as well as datasets such as SST (Socher et al.,
2013) for sentiment analysis and SNLI (Bowman
et al., 2015) for natural language inference. Users
can use the built-in victim models and datasets to
quickly conduct adversarial attacks. The following
code snippet shows how to use Genetic (Alzantot
et al., 2018) to attack BERT on the SST dataset:
import OpenAttack as oa
# choose trained victim model
victim = oa.DataManager.load("Victim.BERT.SST")
# choose evaluation dataset
dataset = oa.DataManager.load("Dataset.SST.sample
")[:10]
# choose Genetic as the attacker
attacker = oa.attackers.GeneticAttacker()
# prepare for attacking
attack_eval = oa.attack_evals.DefaultAttackEval(
attacker, victim)
# launch attacks and print attack results
attack_eval.eval(dataset, visualize=True)
Figure 2: Part of attack results for individual instances.
Figure 3: Summary of attack results.
Figure 2 displays the printed attack results for
individual instances from above code. We can see
OpenAttack prints the original text sequence
as well as the word-aligned adversarial example,
where the perturbed words/chars are colored. In
addition, a series of attack evaluation results are
listed. At the end of individual attack results,
OpenAttack provides an attack summary com-
posed of average evaluation results of specified
metrics among all instances, as shown in Figure 3.
4.2 Customized Victim Models
It is a very common use for users to launch attacks
against their own models that have been trained
on specific datasets, particularly when evaluating
the robustness of a victim model. It is impossi-
ble to exhaustively build in all the victim models
in an adversarial attack toolkit. Therefore, easy
customization for victim models is very important.
OpenAttack provides simple and convenient
interfaces for victim model customization. For
a trained model saved with whichever program-
ming framework, users just need to configure some
model access interfaces that provide accessibility
required for the attack model under the Classifier
class. The following code snippet shows how to
use Genetic to attack a customized sentiment anal-
ysis model (a statistical model built in NLTK) on
SST.
import OpenAttack as oa
import numpy as np
from nltk.sentiment.vader import
SentimentIntensityAnalyzer
# configure access interface of customized model
class MyClassifier(oa.Classifier):
def __init__(self):
self.model = SentimentIntensityAnalyzer()
def get_prob(self, input_):
rt = []
for sent in input_:
rs = self.model.polarity_scores(sent)
prob = rs["pos"] / (rs["neg"] + rs["
pos"])
rt.append(np.array([1 - prob, prob]))
return np.array(rt)
# choose evaluation dataset
dataset = oa.load("Dataset.SST.sample")[:10]
# choose the costomized classifier
clsf = MyClassifier()
# choose Genetic as the attack model
attacker = oa.attackers.GeneticAttacker()
# prepare for attacking
attack_eval = oa.attack_evals.DefaultAttackEval(
attacker, clsf)
# launch attacks and print attack results
attack_eval.eval(dataset, visualize=True)
In addition, OpenAttack also supports easy
customization of various attack models thanks to
its inclusive modular design. Due to limited space,
please access the toolkit GitHub page for examples.
5 Evaluation
In this section, we conduct evaluations for all the at-
tack models currently included in OpenAttack.
We use SST-2 as the evaluation dataset and
choose BERT, specifically BERTBASE, as the vic-
tim model. After fine-tuning on the training set,
BERT achieves 90.31 accuracy on the test set. Due
to great diversity of attack models, it is hard to
impose many constraints on attacks like previous
work that focuses on a specific kind of attack, e.g.,
setting maximum word modification rate for word-
level attacks. We only restrict the maximum victim
model query times to 500. In addition, to improve
evaluation efficiency, we randomly sample 1, 000
correctly classified instances from the test set as the
original sequence to be perturbed. We use the orig-
inal default hyper-parameter settings of all attack
models.
Table 3 shows the evaluation results. By compar-
ison with originally reported results, we confirm
the correctness of our implementation. This might
be the first time to conduct such extensive and com-
prehensive comparison of different attack models.
For some attack models, hyper-parameters have
significant influence on final results, and they can
be easily adjusted according to user’s requirements.
Model
Type Effectiveness Adversarial Example Quality Attack Efficiency
Accessibility Perturbation ASR WMR LES SemSim Fluency Grm #Query Time
SEA Decision Sentence 0.12 – 14.7 0.90 398 2.2 2.0 37.1
SCPN Blind Sentence 0.68 – 55.6 0.56 432 2.7 11.0 14.0
GAN Decision Sentence 0.41 – 68.8 0.26 512 4.2 2.0 2.6
TextFooler Score Word 0.90 0.11 14.1 0.87 621 4.6 130.5 1.5
PWWS Score Word 0.78 0.20 17.9 0.84 613 2.9 124.8 1.5
Genetic Score Word 0.36 0.11 13.4 0.88 689 4.7 242.1 14.9
FD Gradient Word 0.16 0.24 17.9 0.85 908 3.1 10.9 4.4
TextBugger Gradient Word+Char 0.25 0.15 10.6 0.61 512 7.1 150.0 89.0
TextBugger Score Word+Char 0.22 0.15 11.9 0.51 510 8.3 98.4 104.0
UAT Gradient Word 0.43 0.15 24.0 0.85 620 2.8 2.0 0.2
HotFlip Gradient Word 0.47 0.08 8.9 0.93 333 2.7 105.4 5.7
VIPER Blind Char 0.27 – 24.2 0.22 347 15.8 3.0 0.2
DeepWordBug Score Char 0.46 0.20 7.9 0.73 731 6.1 22.0 3.4
Table 3: Evaluation results of different attack models when attacking BERT on SST-2. ASR = Attack Success Rate,
WMR = Word Modification Rate, LES = Levenshterin Edit Distance, SemSim = Semantic Similarity measured by
Universal Sentence Encoder, Fluency is measured by GPT-2 perplexity, Grm = Grammaticality measured by the
number of grammatical errors, #Query = average victim model query times, and Time is the average running time
(seconds).
6 Related Work
There have been quite a few open-source libraries
of generating adversarial examples for continuous
data, especially images, such as CleverHans (Pa-
pernot et al., 2018), Foolbox (Rauber et al., 2017),
Adversarial Robustness Toolbox (ART) (Nicolae
et al., 2018) and AdvBox (Goodman et al., 2020).
These libraries enable practitioners to easily make
adversarial attacks with different methods and have
greatly facilitated the development of adversarial
attacking for continuous data.
As for discrete data, particularly text, there exist
few adversarial attack libraries. As far as we know,
TextAttack (Morris et al., 2020) is the only such
library. Similar to our toolkit, TextAttack embodies
several attack models which can be assembled by
some fundamental components under a framework.
However, its proposed framework is only applica-
ble to gradient- or score-based attack models that
use word- or character-level perturbations, and as a
result, all the attack models included in TextAttack
are gradient/score-based and word/character-level.
In contrast, OpenAttack is based on a highly in-
clusive architecture that supports all attack types
including decision-based/blind and sentence-level
attacks. Also, OpenAttack provides more attack
evaluation metrics. Finally, OpenAttack is more
flexible and easy-to-use, especially when attacking
a customized victim model. Table 4 illustrates the
comparison of TextAttack and OpenAttack.
There are also some other toolkits concerned
with textual adversarial attacking. TEAPOT
Toolkit TextAttack OpenAttack
Accessibility Gradient, Score Gradient, Score, Decision, Blind
Perturbation Char, Word Char, Word, Sentence
Evaluation Metrics
Attack Effectiveness (1)
Adversarial Example Quality (1)
Attack Efficiency (2)
Attack Effectiveness (1)
Adversarial Example Quality (5)
Attack Efficiency (2)
Flexibility Mediocre High
Table 4: Comparison of TextAttack and OpenAttack.
The numbers in parentheses denote the numbers of eval-
uation metrics.
(Michel et al., 2019) is a open-source toolkit to
evaluate the effectiveness of textual adversarial
examples from the perspective of preservation of
meaning. It is mainly designed for the attacks
against sequence-to-sequence models, but can be
also geared towards text classification models. Al-
lenNLP Interpret (Wallace et al., 2019b) is a frame-
work for explaining the predictions of NLP models,
where adversarial attacking is one of its interpreta-
tion methods. It focuses on interpretability of NLP
models and only incorporates two attack models.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we present OpenAttack, an open-
source textual adversarial attack toolkit that sup-
ports a wide range of functions in textual adversar-
ial attacking. It currently incorporates 12 typical
attack models that cover all attack types. Moreover,
it has great flexibility and extensibility and provides
easy customization of victim models and attack
models. In the future, we will keep OpenAttack
updated to incorporate more up-to-date attack mod-
els and support more functions.
References
Moustafa Alzantot, Yash Sharma, Ahmed Elgohary,
Bo-Jhang Ho, Mani Srivastava, and Kai-Wei Chang.
2018. Generating natural language adversarial ex-
amples. In Proceedings of the EMNLP.
Yonatan Belinkov and Yonatan Bisk. 2018. Synthetic
and natural noise both break neural machine transla-
tion. In Proceedings of ICLR.
Steven Bird, Ewan Klein, and Edward Loper. 2009.
Natural language processing with Python: analyz-
ing text with the natural language toolkit. O’Reilly
Media, Inc.
Samuel Bowman, Gabor Angeli, Christopher Potts, and
Christopher D Manning. 2015. A large annotated
corpus for learning natural language inference. In
Proceedings of EMNLP.
Daniel Cer, Yinfei Yang, Sheng-yi Kong, Nan Hua,
Nicole Limtiaco, Rhomni St John, Noah Constant,
Mario Guajardo-Cespedes, Steve Yuan, Chris Tar,
et al. 2018. Universal sentence encoder for english.
In Proceedings of EMNLP.
Jacob Devlin, Ming-Wei Chang, Kenton Lee, and
Kristina Toutanova. 2019. BERT: Pre-training of
deep bidirectional Transformers for language under-
standing. In Proceedings of NAACL-HLT.
Javid Ebrahimi, Anyi Rao, Daniel Lowd, and Dejing
Dou. 2018. Hotflip: White-box adversarial exam-
ples for text classification. In Proceedings of ACL.
Steffen Eger, Go¨zde Gu¨l S¸ahin, Andreas Ru¨ckle´, Ji-
Ung Lee, Claudia Schulz, Mohsen Mesgar, Kr-
ishnkant Swarnkar, Edwin Simpson, and Iryna
Gurevych. 2019. Text processing like humans do:
Visually attacking and shielding NLP systems. In
Proceedings of NAACL-HLT.
Ji Gao, Jack Lanchantin, Mary Lou Soffa, and Yanjun
Qi. 2018. Black-box generation of adversarial text
sequences to evade deep learning classifiers. In Pro-
ceedings of IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops.
Ian J Goodfellow, Jonathon Shlens, and Christian
Szegedy. 2015. Explaining and harnessing adversar-
ial examples. In Proceedings of ICLR.
Dou Goodman, Hao Xin, Wang Yang, Wu Yuesheng,
Xiong Junfeng, and Zhang Huan. 2020. Advbox: a
toolbox to generate adversarial examples that fool
neural networks. arXiv preprint arXiv:2001.05574.
Sepp Hochreiter and Ju¨rgen Schmidhuber. 1997.
Long short-term memory. Neural Computation,
9(8):1735–1780.
Mohit Iyyer, John Wieting, Kevin Gimpel, and Luke
Zettlemoyer. 2018. Adversarial example generation
with syntactically controlled paraphrase networks.
In Proceedings of the NAACL-HLT.
Robin Jia and Percy Liang. 2017. Adversarial exam-
ples for evaluating reading comprehension systems.
In Proceedings of EMNLP.
Di Jin, Zhijing Jin, Joey Tianyi Zhou, and Peter
Szolovits. 2020. Is BERT really robust? Natural
language attack on text classification and entailment.
In Proceedings of AAAI.
Rafal Jozefowicz, Oriol Vinyals, Mike Schuster, Noam
Shazeer, and Yonghui Wu. 2016. Exploring
the limits of language modeling. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1602.02410.
Jinfeng Li, Shouling Ji, Tianyu Du, Bo Li, and Ting
Wang. 2019. Textbugger: Generating adversarial
text against real-world applications. In Proceedings
of Network and Distributed Systems Security Sympo-
sium.
Paul Michel, Xian Li, Graham Neubig, and Juan Pino.
2019. On evaluation of adversarial perturbations
for sequence-to-sequence models. In Proceedings
NAACL-HLT.
John X Morris, Eli Lifland, Jin Yong Yoo, and Yan-
jun Qi. 2020. Textattack: A framework for adver-
sarial attacks in natural language processing. arXiv
preprint arXiv:2005.05909.
Maria-Irina Nicolae, Mathieu Sinn, Minh Ngoc Tran,
Beat Buesser, Ambrish Rawat, Martin Wistuba,
Valentina Zantedeschi, Nathalie Baracaldo, Bryant
Chen, Heiko Ludwig, et al. 2018. Adversar-
ial robustness toolbox v1. 0.0. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1807.01069.
Nicolas Papernot, Fartash Faghri, Nicholas Carlini, Ian
Goodfellow, Reuben Feinman, Alexey Kurakin, Ci-
hang Xie, Yash Sharma, Tom Brown, Aurko Roy,
Alexander Matyasko, Vahid Behzadan, Karen Ham-
bardzumyan, Zhishuai Zhang, Yi-Lin Juang, Zhi Li,
Ryan Sheatsley, Abhibhav Garg, Jonathan Uesato,
Willi Gierke, Yinpeng Dong, David Berthelot, Paul
Hendricks, Jonas Rauber, and Rujun Long. 2018.
Technical report on the cleverhans v2.1.0 adversarial
examples library. arXiv preprint arXiv:1610.00768.
Nicolas Papernot, Patrick McDaniel, Somesh Jha, Matt
Fredrikson, Z Berkay Celik, and Ananthram Swami.
2016a. The limitations of deep learning in adversar-
ial settings. In 2016 IEEE European symposium on
security and privacy (EuroS&P). IEEE.
Nicolas Papernot, Patrick McDaniel, Ananthram
Swami, and Richard Harang. 2016b. Crafting adver-
sarial input sequences for recurrent neural networks.
In Proceedings of MILCOM.
Peng Qi, Yuhao Zhang, Yuhui Zhang, Jason Bolton,
and Christopher D. Manning. 2020. Stanza: A
Python natural language processing toolkit for many
human languages. In Proceedings of ACL.
Alec Radford, Jeffrey Wu, Rewon Child, David Luan,
Dario Amodei, and Ilya Sutskever. 2019. Language
models are unsupervised multitask learners. OpenAI
Blog, 1(8).
Jonas Rauber, Wieland Brendel, and Matthias Bethge.
2017. Foolbox: A python toolbox to benchmark the
robustness of machine learning models. In ICML
Reliable Machine Learning in the Wild Workshop.
Shuhuai Ren, Yihe Deng, Kun He, and Wanxiang Che.
2019. Generating natural language adversarial ex-
amples through probability weighted word saliency.
In Proceedings of ACL.
Marco Tulio Ribeiro, Sameer Singh, and Carlos
Guestrin. 2018. Semantically equivalent adversarial
rules for debugging NLP models. In Proceedings of
ACL.
Richard Socher, Alex Perelygin, Jean Wu, Jason
Chuang, Christopher D Manning, Andrew Ng, and
Christopher Potts. 2013. Recursive deep models
for semantic compositionality over a sentiment tree-
bank. In Proceedings of EMNLP.
Christian Szegedy, Wojciech Zaremba, Ilya Sutskever,
Joan Bruna, Dumitru Erhan, Ian Goodfellow, and
Rob Fergus. 2014. Intriguing properties of neural
networks. In Proceedings of ICLR.
Eric Wallace, Shi Feng, Nikhil Kandpal, Matt Gard-
ner, and Sameer Singh. 2019a. Universal adversarial
triggers for attacking and analyzing NLP. In Pro-
ceedings of EMNLP-IJCNLP.
Eric Wallace, Jens Tuyls, Junlin Wang, Sanjay Subra-
manian, Matt Gardner, and Sameer Singh. 2019b.
Allennlp interpret: A framework for explaining pre-
dictions of nlp models. In Proceedings of EMNLP-
IJCNLP.
Yuan Zang, Fanchao Qi, Chenghao Yang, Zhiyuan Liu,
Meng Zhang, Qun Liu, and Maosong Sun. 2020.
Word-level textual adversarial attacking as combina-
torial optimization. In Proceedings of ACL.
Huangzhao Zhang, Hao Zhou, Ning Miao, and Lei Li.
2019. Generating fluent adversarial examples for
natural languages. In Proceedings of ACL.
Wei Emma Zhang, Quan Z Sheng, Ahoud Alhazmi,
and Chenliang Li. 2020. Adversarial attacks on
deep-learning models in natural language process-
ing: A survey. ACM Transactions on Intelligent Sys-
tems and Technology (TIST), 11(3):1–41.
Zhengli Zhao, Dheeru Dua, and Sameer Singh. 2018.
Generating natural adversarial examples. In Pro-
ceedings of ICLR.
